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REFORM AND MODERNIZATION OF THE 
INDONESIAN FORCES  
 
Francesco Montessoro 
Between 1966 and 1998 senior members of the Indonesian military were appointed to legislative and 
administrative bodies and occupied key positions in the bureaucracy as well as in state-owned 
corporations. They also held a number of legislative seats in the parliament  and influenced the 
government-supported party GOLKAR. Since 1998, however, a process of democratization has led to a 
greater civilian control of the armed forces. The study focuses on this process as well as on the external 
challenges faced by the Indonesian armed forces. 
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The role of the armed forces 
After 1998, when Suharto resigned from the presidency, the Republic of 
Indonesia enacted reforms aimed at making the country a democracy. This 
process involved the whole of society and the political system as well as 
the institutions and the organs of the state, and primarily the armed 
forces1. 
As a matter of fact, the military played a very remarkable role during the 
so-called New Order regime (1966-1998),founded after the attempted coup 
of September 30, 1965 when the armed forces destroyed the Indonesian 
communist party and eliminated the influence of the old political 
organizations such as the nationalist and Islamic parties. In the second 
half of the Sixties the military, under the leadership of general Suharto, 
began to build a new authoritarian system grounded on the so-called 
“dwi-fungsi”, the double function: since then, and for three decades, the 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia, the Indonesian Armed 
Forces), have been involved not only in defence matters but also in 
non‐military activities. 
Throughout this period senior members of the military – both retired and 
active – were appointed to legislative and administrative bodies and 
occupied key positions in the bureaucracy as well as in state-owned 
corporations. Thanks to the electoral laws of 1969, the armed forces held a 
number of the legislative seats in the Indonesian parliament (the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Council) and were able to 
influence the government-supported GOLKAR party. Further more, the 
territorial command structure of the army paralleled the civil 
organization from cabinet down to village level, so the regime facilitated 
surveillance of the whole society by monitoring the activities of political 
parties, trade unions and ethnic or religious groups, including the control 
of paramilitary units useful as unofficial means to strike at and 
undermine all potential opposition. Last but not least, the strength of the 
armed forces as an institutional actor, and the lack of adequate budgetary 
                                                             
1Emmerson, D. K. (Ed.), Indonesia beyond Suharto. Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, 
Armonk:Sharpe, 1999; Crouch, H., Wiranto and Habibie: Civil-Military Relations since 
May 1998, in Budiman, A., Hatley, B. and Kingsbury, D. (Eds.), Reformasi: Crisis and 
Change in Indonesia, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1999, pp. 127-48; Shiraishi, T., 
The Indonesian Military in Politics, in Schwartz, A. and Paris, J. (Eds.), The Politics of 
Post-Suharto Indonesia, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999, pp. 
73-86;Alagappa, M. (Ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the 
Military in Asia, Stanford: Stanford U.P., 2001;Rabasa, A. and Haseman, J.,The 
Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics and Power, Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2002; Kingsbury, D., Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, London-New 
York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003; Mietzner, M., Military Politics, Islam, and the State in 
Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, Singapore: ISEAS, 
2009; Crouch, H., Political Reform in Indonesia After Suharto, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010. 
3 
 
©
IS
P
I2
0
1
4
 
 
 
 
support from the government, allowed the military to undertake business 
activities and defend the principle of unit self-sufficiency in terms of 
financial resources; the importance of these economic interests (typically 
in the logistics sector) often led the military to get involved in profiteering 
and embezzlement, in the context of typical crony capitalism2. 
Military reforms 
In Indonesia after 1998 military reforms were implemented under intense 
pressure from human rights activists and the urban intellectual elite 
calling for a full democracy. Hence, the fall of Suharto and the beginning of 
a reformist phase led to creating new civil-military relations with the 
intent of establishing democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. 
In the summer of 1998, the military leadership was divided over policy to 
address the country’s changing political scene and, in the difficult context 
of the regime’s crisis, a group of officers who were bent on reforms aimed 
at disengaging the armed forces from a direct involvement in the social, 
economic and political sphere prevailed. In a seminar held in late 
September 1998 in Bandung the so-called “New Paradigm” was 
formulated according to which the military must be neither in the 
forefront of national politics nor seek to occupy political positions, but 
rather should influence the decision-making process. 
The elite of the armed forces then accepted to carry out internal reforms 
such as separating the police from the military’s chain of command and 
liquidating political departments within the army structure. Equally 
important were the withdrawal of military representatives from the 
legislatures and the restriction of officers from appointments to civil 
offices. In more political terms the armed forces had to cut formal ties with 
GOLKAR (in the past, territorial commands had been used to protect the 
ruling party and boost its electoral gains), and adopt a more neutral 
stance during national elections. The high command itself also managed 
to depoliticise military officers and reinstitute professionalism within the 
establishment. The turning point was the decision on 1 April 1999 to 
                                                             
2 D.S. LEV, “The political role of the Army in Indonesia”, in Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, no. 4, 
pp. 349-64; H. CROUCH, The Army and politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell U.P., 
1978; U. SUNDHAUSSEN,.The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 
1945-1967, Oxford-Kuala Lumpur, Oxford U.P., 1982; D. JENKINS, Suharto and His 
Generals. Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983, Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 
Cornell University, 1984; L. SURYADINATA, Military Ascendancy and Political 
Culture: a Study of Indonesian Golkar, Athens, Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1989; R. LOWRY, The Armed Forces of Indonesia, St. 
Leonards:Allen and Unwin, 1996; F. MONTESSORO, The Rise of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces, in A.C. Lavagnino, C. Molteni e F. Montessoro (Eds.), Reflections on Asia. 
Essays in honour of EnricaCollottiPischel, Milano, FancoAngeli, 2003, pp. 165-188. 
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create a police force (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, POLRI) 
separate from the other corps of the military, giving up direct control of 
internal security matters. At the same time, the ABRI was renamed 
Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI, Indonesian National Armed Forces3. 
Further attempts at military reform were reflected in a document 
published in 2001 (The Role of TNI in the 21st Century) in which the 
commitment to national defence was stressed by developing an overall 
warfare doctrine aimed at defending state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and leaving out the maintenance of public order. In 2002 an act 
was adopted about the purpose and core values of state defence. This 
document  dealt among other things with the institutional relationship 
between the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence, and the 
authorisation of the use of force and the oversight of Parliament. In 2004 
it was agreed that the military must be deployed in less stable areas and 
in border regions, avoiding a structure corresponding to civilian 
bureaucracy or tied to political interests. At last, in 2009, a law was 
approved concerning the take-over of military businesses by the 
government. In this process the first civilian Ministers of Defence have 
played a leading role: Juwono Sudarsono promoted the concept of 
“minimum essential forces” for the TNI’s development; Mahfud M.D. and 
Matori Abdul Djalil enacted the two main laws on national defence; 
Purnomo Yusgiantoro rebuilt Indonesia’s strategic industrial capacity. 
The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy entailed civilian 
control over the armed forces in order to weaken the military’s influence 
on post-authoritarian institutions4. This process was difficult owing to, on 
the one hand, the lack of a democratic framework and an adequate system 
of checks and balances and, on the other, the political elite’s inability to 
implement its decisions through the military bureaucracy: in Indonesia 
the Defence Department, although staffed with civilian officials, was still 
dominated by the military, which was determined to hinder the reforms by 
taking advantage of a certain degree of bureaucratic inertia. Besides, at 
least from 1999 to 2004, some politicians did not refrain from appealing to 
                                                             
3 The two main documents on the separation of the Police from the armed forces are 
MPR-RI Decree no. VI/2000 on Institutional Separation of TNI and POLRI and 
MPR-RI Decree no.VII/2000 on the Role of TNI and POLRI. See also Y. CHRISNANDI, 
Post-Suharto Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia, RSIS Monograph no. 10, Singapore, 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007; T.S.  Hafidz, Fading Away: The 
Political Role of the Army in Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy, 1998–2001, RSIS 
Monograph no. 8, Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2006; J. 
HONNA, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia, New York: Routledge, 
2003. 
4 J.P. ATE, The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces in the Context of Indonesia’s 
Democratisation,  Shedden Papers, Canberra: Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, 
2010, pp. 7-9. 
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the leadership of the armed forces in order to get the support of a still 
powerful institution (or of the military’s conservative factions). In the 
turmoil of the transition, the militias of some political parties and radical 
groups, often linked to the military, were mobilized against their 
opponents to attain specific goals. After the fall of the Suharto regime, 
these militias, sometimes directed by opposing factions of the armed forces, 
became a characteristic of Indonesian politics, contributing to the violence 
and the instability of that period. 
Although this process was  not completed ’till 2009 – owing to many legal 
and institutional loopholes –, the transition went on with the calling of 
national elections in 1999 and the successive institutional reforms of 
2001-2004, allowing f greater democratic control of the military and the 
transformation of the whole security sector to ensure better inner and 
external safety conditions. 
Outline of Indonesia’s strategic modernization 
Besides democratic and civilian control, another problem of the 
Indonesian armed forces has been its modernization. It is doubtful that 
actually the TNI could carry out its missions as its force posture is deemed 
far below the minimum necessary to defend state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, especially in Indonesia’s surrounding seas: the 
Indonesian archipelago includes more than 13,000 islands stretching over 
two million square kilometres. 
The Indonesian armed forces – for a long time involved mainly in domestic 
security to quell communal and religious violence as well as armed 
insurgencies in Aceh province and in West Papua, and to counter Islamic 
terrorism – remain ill prepared to face external threats and now have a 
pressing need to replace many old military platforms and improve the 
standard of readiness and professionalism in all services. Indeed, the 
weakness of Indonesia’s strategic modernization is perhaps rooted in the 
“total people war” doctrine of the earlier struggle for independence from 
the Netherlands (1946-49), which implies the supremacy of the army and 
concern for territorial control. 
The possibility of conflicts with some neighbours, such as Papua New 
Guinea, Malaysia or China, is currently low because a land invasion is 
unlikely at least for the next ten to fifteen years, but Indonesia has begun 
to express a certain uneasiness about the security of its territorial waters 
and the safety of vital sea lanes, mainly the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and 
Lombok. So this issue remains a high priority task for Indonesian armed 
forces, which have difficulty in controlling littoral approaches and air 
space. Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea, for instance, are a real 
concern for Indonesia, which in 2010 was involved in an incident with 
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Chinese patrol boats off the Natuna islands. Jakartaalso has territorial 
disputes with Singapore, the Philippines and Kuala Lumpur over some 
islands claimed by Malaysia. Moreover, Indonesia faces new maritime 
security challenges such as piracy, smuggling and other forms of illegal 
trafficking that are growing in the region. 
Indonesia needs military capabilities such as sea and air combat forces, 
missile defence, and above all modern systems of command, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance that are lacking or seriously inadequate5. 
It seems that present defence procurements do not boost the TNI’s 
capacity to deter and respond to military aggression. Indonesia ‘s ability to 
link its foreign policy objectives and the armed forces’ strategic role has so 
far been limited. But, since Jakarta’s potential power is expected to 
increase thanks to coherent economic growth in the last ten years, it is 
necessary to think about what role in the near future the military should 
play in relation to country’s regional and global policy. As Indonesia is 
without an expansionist foreign policy, the TNI must develop a sound 
maritime strategy in connexion with control of Indonesian territorial 
waters and its 200-nautical-mile “Exclusive Economic Zone”6. 
The financial basis of modernization 
An important challenge for the modernization of the Indonesian military 
is budget’s policy. The government has always provided insufficient 
funding to its military, which as a consequences lacks satisfactory 
resources for equipment, armament and personnel welfare. Besides, much 
of the defence budget consists of personnel costs and expenditure for 
maintaining armaments and military facilities, while the proportion of 
defence procurements only amounts to a third of total spending. Moreover, 
the leadership of the armed forces has shown no particular interest to 
either soldier welfare or in increasing investments in modern equipment. 
In the past ten years, Indonesia has increased the size of its defence 
budget but still suffers from an economic gap between actual expenditure 
and parliamentary budget proposals, and from a latent inefficiency in its 
defence spending patterns7. It is relevant that in the years from 2003 to 
2012 the Indonesian defence budget has remained below one per cent of 
Gross Domestic Product, from 0.99% in 2003 to 0.86% in 20128. 
                                                             
5 J. BRADFORD, The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and 
Ramifications for Reform, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2005. 
6 B. SINGH, Civil-Military Relations in Democratising Indonesia: The Potentials and 
Limits to Change, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, no. 141, Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2001. 
7 J.P. ATE, The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces, cit., pp. 10-11. 
8 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, London, 
Routledge, 2005 to 2010. 
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Indonesia’s defence spending (7.74 billion dollars in 2012) is particularly 
low when the size of the armed forces is compared to that of other regional 
actors’9. 
Even the maritime and air sectors, reputed to be of primary importance 
for defence purposes in the strategic discourse, are not well funded. Indeed, 
in the last ten years there has been no change in the capabilities of the 
Indonesian navy and air force compared to Indonesia’s more assertive 
partners in Southeast Asia(and to China, Japan, Australia and South 
Korea). The so-called “green water” navy project, with its planned 274 new 
ships by 2024, is probably too ambitious in light of the real data of only 
65,000 personnel, poor expertise and permanent financial constraints that 
make this modernization program unreliable10. The upgrading of the 
Indonesian air fleet appears equally unlikely due to insufficient funding11. 
In recent years, both the navy and air force got a lesser share of the 
defence budget, with an average of 15% and 11% respectively, compared to 
the army, by far the larger service with manpower of 233,000 (more than 
75% of the three services)12. In any case, the funds available to the army 
cannot really boost its modernization, owing to its size and its large 
territorial troop deployment into 12 regional commands spread across the 
country. The existent modernization projects concerning the army are 
aimed at developing rapidly deployable units equipped with tanks and 
combat vehicles; this would require airborne capability and good logistics 
to protect the so-called “outer islands” off Java, and the archipelago’s 
broad periphery13. 
By and large, it could be argued that the success of Indonesia’s military 
modernization is linked to government’s ability to ensure well-equipped 
and more professional armed forces, to strengthen the industrial national 
defence base so as to reduce heavy reliance on more than twenty different 
countries – a dependence that has made Indonesia extremely vulnerable 
to arms embargoes. In addition, the success of modernization lies in the 
civilian control of the armed forces (and in solving the issue of its business 
activities), though this is unlikely due to the inertia that prevails within. 
Indonesia’s new parliamentary institutions and their indifference to 
develop expertise in defence matters. 
                                                             
9 B. SCHREER, Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s Military Modernisation, 
Barton: Australia Strategic Policy Institute, 2013, p. 16. 
10 Ibid., pp. 18-22. 
11 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
12 R. SUKMA, Indonesia’s Security Outlook, Defence Policy and Regional Cooperation, 
Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS Joint Research Series no. 5, 2010, 
pp. 12-16. 
13 L.C. SEBASTIAN, and IISGINDARSAH, Assessing 12-year Military Reform in 
Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform, RSIS Monograph no. 227, 
Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2011. 
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Reform has brought about the transformation of the Indonesian armed 
forces from a military corps with a political function into a military 
institution accountable to a democratic society. The TNI has adapted well 
to democracy and, while still far from being marginalised from the 
political arena, its prerogatives have been considerably reduced and it has 
lost its direct influence on society. Yet, there remain some issues that could 
hamper reform, such as the inadequate relations between the armed 
forces and other institutions and the slow pace of Indonesia’s democratic 
reform programme. 
 
 
 
 
 
